Chapter 2

Chapter Three: Japan's Meiji State

In 1868, a new government replace the bakufu. In theory, this new government represented the emperor, although in reality a group of relatively young samurai from the domains of Satsuma and Chōshū were its real leaders. The event that brought this new government to power is called the Meiji Restoration because it ostensibly "restored" the emperor to his allegedly proper position as actual ruler of the state. In fact, emperors had not actually ruled Japan since the Heian period, but the notion that the emperor ought properly to be the head of state and the locus of national sovereignty was the major foundation of the Meiji state and its successors, the Taishō and Shōwa (until 1946) states. At first, it was not clear what relationship the new Meiji state and the old domains would be. Within a few years, however, the Meiji state moved decisively and successfully to eliminate the domains and to make itself a strong centralized government with no rivals. To better understand the nature of the Transition from Tokugawa to Meiji, take a brief look at the political situation that developed early in the Tokugawa period.

First Fifty Years of the Tokugawa Period*

(*Read this section once through for background information. You need not worry about remembering the details.)

A decisive battle took place in 1600, in which the forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu won. This battle left Tokugawa Ieyasu the most powerful person in Japan. Ieyasu was more than an excellent general. He was also a shrewd politician and institution builder. In the course of capitalizing on his victory, Ieyasu established a strong and stable bakufu that ruled Japan until the 1860s. The period from 1603, the date Ieyasu formally took the title of shōgun, until the last shōgun's resignation in 1867, is known as the Tokugawa period or Edo period (some start the period in 1600).

Compared with the two periods preceding it, the #Tokugawa (or Edo) period# 江戸時代 (1603-1867) was a time of relative peace and prosperity. It was also a colorful age with an urban culture that tended to reject the gloom and longing for virtue of the Muromachi period. The Tokugawa period gets its name from the family of shōguns who presided over a strong bakufu. The strength of the Tokugawa bakufu helped create an age relatively free of civil strife. Political stability encouraged cultural and economic growth. Forms of high culture that were once the province of an elite few became widely available, in the major cities at least, via a variety of private schools and academies. Neither the court aristocracy nor the warriors played the major role in shaping urban culture of the Tokugawa period. More than any other group, it was the urban merchants that molded culture. The most vigorous cultural forms of the period reflected the busy, consumption-oriented world of commerce.

Major Steps in the Early Evolution of the Tokugawa Bakufu

1600: Tokugawa Ieyasu (#image#) wins the #Battle of Sekigahara#

1603: Ieyasu takes title of shōgun

1605: Ieyasu "retires," son Hidetada takes over as shōgun

1612: Christianity prohibited

1614-15: Ieyasu destroys Toyotomi Hideyori, Hideyoshi's son

1615: Bakufu issues Laws for Warrior Households

1616: Ieyasu dies (#his mausoleum at Nikkō#)

1623: Hidetada retires, son Iemitsu becomes shōgun

1629: Laws for warrior households revised & reissued (#complete text of the laws#--note that the existence of laws does not necessarily mean they were enforced)

1635-6: Trade with China & European countries limited to Nagasaki Japanese forbidden freely to travel abroad (#text of relevant regulations#--note that the rules regarding Japanese returning from abroad were almost never enforced)

1635: System of "alternate attendance" made mandatory for all (#excellent explanation and images#)

1637-8: #Shimabara Uprising# causes more resources devoted to rooting out Christianity

1638: Portuguese ships prohibited

1641: Dutch trading center moves to Nagasaki (also the site of #Chinese trade#); British traders leave Japan on their own volition

1651: 3rd shōgun, Iemitsu, dies

Looking back now, we can see that the Tokugawa period was comparatively peaceful and stable compared with preceding centuries. From the standpoint of 1605, or even 1625, however, it was by no means clear what the future would bring. Furthermore, although in retrospect we can see that the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu was actually the beginning of the end of the age of warrior dominance in society, at the dawn of the Tokugawa period the warrior seemed central to any social order. The founding premise of the Tokugawa bakufu was, therefore, that he who controls the warriors controls all of Japan. The bakufu's early institutional development reflected this premise.

In 1603, Tokugawa Ieyasu took the title shōgun. As the most powerful person in Japan, he could have taken any title he wanted. In contrast with Hideyoshi, Ieyasu had many children by his various wives and concubines and so there was no shortage of potential heirs to his position. Ieyasu selected his son Hidetada 秀忠 to succeed to the position of shōgun and then "retired" to rule from behind the scenes--in what by now should be a very familiar style of exercising power in Japan. By retiring, Ieyasu was able to ensure a smooth transition and succession between himself and his son.

In 1612, Hidetada issued a decree prohibiting Christianity in Japan. In Hideyoshi's day, nearly one percent of Japan's population had become Christian, at least nominally. When Christianity, in the form of Roman Catholicism, first came to Japan, most Japanese regarded it as a variety of Buddhism. Recall that for Mahayana Buddhists, nearly anything can be Buddhism. As time went on, however, Japan's leaders, starting with Hideyoshi, became uneasy about the potential political power of Christianity. Many regarded Christianity as similar to the militant sects of Buddhism that Oda Nobunaga had so recently destroyed. The early Tokugawa shōguns saw that Catholicism and Spanish and Portuguese military expansion throughout the globe seemed to go hand-in-hand (#Spanish conquest explained#). The bakufu ban on Christianity, therefore, was based in part on fears of its potential for causing internal political unrest. It was also based on fear that Christianity might help pave the way for an external invasion by Spain or Portugal. The bakufu banned certain militant forms of Buddhism around this time for similar reasons.

Excerpts from Laws for Warrior Households

Perhaps the most important step in solidifying the power of his family was for Ieyasu to eliminate the only other person in Japan with a possible claim to legitimacy as ruler. This person was Hideyoshi's son, Hideyori 秀頼, now a young man. Hideyori, was, of course, the one Ieyasu and other leading warlords (daimyō) had sworn to the dying Hideyoshi that they would forever protect. Hideyori resided in Ōsaka castle and had with him a force of warriors hostile to Tokugawa Ieyasu. In 1614, Ieyasu launched an attack on Ōsaka castle, which lasted into 1615. In the end, all inside, including Hideyori, were slaughtered.

After this victory, the bakufu issued Laws for Warrior Households (Buke shohatto 武家諸法度). These laws applied to all members of the samurai class, whether in the direct service of the Tokugawa family or otherwise. The laws were a mixture of vague moral exhortations (e.g., lead a frugal and simple life), unlikely to be enforceable, and specific restrictions or requirements. Many items, such as the restrictions on castle construction and marriages, were intended to weaken the power of the  vis-à-vis the bakufu. These laws established the basic framework of the relationship between the warlords--who continued to exist throughout the Tokugawa period--and the bakufu. In 1629, the bakufu issued a revised version of the Laws for Warrior Households, and they underwent several more revisions during the next century.

Ieyasu died in 1616. His death caused no particular problems, however, for Hidetada had become well-acquainted with the office of shōgun and continued his father's work of creating a strong bakufu under the Tokugawa family. Like his father, Hidetada also "retired" while in good health. In 1623, he handed the office of shōgun over to his son Iemitsu 家光, further establishing the Tokugawa family's hold over the highest office in the land. Tokugawa Ieyasu and his sons were not scholars, but they had a basic understanding of history. They learned from the examples of figures from the past who had seized power but then lost it, and worked to ensure that power would remain in Tokugawa hands well into the future. To this end, they created stable, viable institutions and also devoted attention to bolstering the religious-symbolic authority of the Tokugawa house.

In the 1630s, the bakufu began imposing restrictions on foreign trade and travel, owing in part to Iemitsu's personal xenophobia. These restrictions were also connected with the earlier ban on Christianity, which the Tokugawa shōguns took most seriously. Furthermore, the restrictions also relfected the overall process of the bakufu tightening its grip on power. In other words, the bakufu reserved for itself the right to direct trade and diplomatic relations with countries outside of Japan. In order better to supervise foreign relations, the bakufu issued orders that no Japanese may travel abroad without shōgunal permission and that foreign trade be restricted mainly to the bakufu-controlled port of Nagasaki. As a result, Dutch merchants moved their trading post to Nagasaki in the 1640s. There was also an English trading post, but it folded of its own accord owing to a lack of profitability. By 1645, there was no British presence in Japan. Spanish and Portuguese ships had, up until this time, engaged in trade with various Japanese domains. Owing to a fear of Spanish and Portuguese military power, and to a general unwillingness of merchants from these two countries to separate trade and religion, the bakufu prohibited Portuguese (and by extension Spanish) ships and persons from entering Japan.

Closely connected with this prohibition was a large-scale uprising by impoverished peasants in the Shimabara Peninsula 島原半島 (1637-8) and nearby islands in Kyūshū. This was an area of Japan in which Christians had been numerous, and the rebels adopted Christian symbols for their banners. With great difficulty, bakufu forces eventually put down the uprising, slaughtering all connected with it. The bakufu even ordered a Dutch warship to assist in the bombardment of the rebels' stronghold, which it did. This uprising caused the already xenophobic Iemitsu to become even more convinced that Christianity was a threat to bakufu political power, and he put extensive resources into a generally successful campaign to root it out. The extremely small number of Christians that continued practicing in Japan had to do so in #great secrecy# until the 1870s.

One of the most important means of bakufu control over the warlords was the system of alternate attendance (sankin kōtai 参勤交代). Under this system, warlords spent half of their time in their local domains and half of their time "in attendance" on the shōgun, living in Edo near the shōgunal palace. The typical arrangement was one year in the domain and one year in Edo. The wives and family members of warlords remained in Edo all the time. This system had a number of advantages for the bakufu. It kept the warlords moving and helped drain some of their financial resources owing to the need to maintain suitably elaborate residences both in their domains and in Edo. Because the warlords spent so much of their time in Edo, they were easier for the shōgun to keep under close watch. Finally, the families of the warlords effectively served as hostages to help guarantee good behavior.

By the time of Tokugawa Iemitsu's death 1651, the bakufu had become firmly established in power, and the Tokugawa family was firmly in control of the bakufu. It was no longer necessary for shōguns to retire in favor of their sons.

We now examine the basic structure of the bakufu and then look at the relationship between the bakufu and the various warlords domains. The bakufu was a large bureaucracy. In theory, and sometimes in practice, the shōgun ruled as absolute dictator. The first three did rule with an iron hand, but after them the situation varied widely depending on circumstances. Some shōguns were weak-willed, incompetent, or simply lazy. Owing to the institutions established during the first fifty years of the bakufu, its governing machinery functioned reasonably well with or without strong shōgunal leadership.

The two most important agencies within the bakufu were the Senior Councilors (rōjū 老中, literally "elders within") and the Junior Councilors (wakadoshiyori 若年寄 literally, "younger elders"). The Senior Councilors usually consisted of four or five warlords of a certain type (we examine types of warlords below). Each individual councilor served as overall bakufu administrator on a monthly rotational basis. The whole group met in council to decide important matters of state, such as the selection of a new shōgun should the previous one die without naming a successor. The Senior Councilors also supervised several high-ranking officials such as the commissioners that administered the major cities (e.g., Ōsaka and Nagasaki, both bakufu-administered), those that oversaw shrines and temples, those in charge of revenue and finance, and others. The Senior Councilors were a powerful group. Some shōguns gave them wide latitude; others tried to rein them in.

The Junior Councilors, all of whom were warlords, were like the Senior Councilors but with slightly lower status. They supervised inspectors, who kept watch over bakufu retainers of sub-warlord rank. The Junior Councilors also supervised the bakufu's corps of intendants. These intendants administered parcels of the bakufu's extensive land holdings throughout Japan. Another important task of the Junior Councilors was supervision of the day-to-day operation of the shōgun's castle in Edo.

Bakufu relations with the warlords were complex. In some respects, the shōgun was simply a very large and powerful warlords. In other respects, such as when dealing with foreign countries, the shōgun was the singular leader of all of Japan. In the Tokugawa period, there were over 250 warlords throughout Japan, whose domains varied in size from tiny (10,000 units of rice productivity) to vast (over half a million units of rice productivity). There were three categories of warlords. Fudai 譜代 were those warlords personally allied with Tokugawa Ieyasu at the time of the Battle of Sekigarhara in 1600. Tozama 外様 were those warlords not allied with Tokugawa Ieyasu at the time of the battle, including those who fought against him and those who did not. Shinpan 親藩 warlords were Tokugawa family relatives. In its early period, the bakufu designated three branches of the Tokugawa family (descending from Ieyasu) as warlords lineages and potential heirs to the office of shōgun should the main line fail to produce a suitable male heir. Later, three more branches assumed shinpan status, making a total of six. Some but not all of these branches had the Tokugawa surname.

As we have seen, some warlords not only administered their own domains but also worked as high-ranking bakufu officials. For bakufu offices requiring warlord status, normally, only fudai were eligible to for appointment. Shinpan warlords occasionally served as bakufu officials, typically as regents for a boy shōgun. Tozama were ineligible to become bakufu officials. The fudai domains were small and often clustered around the larger tozama domains. The first three shōguns worked to create a geographic balance by surrounding tozama domains with the presumably more trustworthy fudai, with the fudai located in positions of strategic importance. Maintaining a balance of power, geographically and otherwise, between all potentially conflicting interests and groups was a conscious policy of the early shōguns. It generally worked well as a means of promoting peace and stability.

After Ieyasu's victory, all the warlords throughout Japan swore allegiance to the Tokugawa house. Such oaths would hardly have been worth the paper on which they were written had not the shōgun and his government (which, of course, included some warlords--an incentive for these warlords to preserve the bakufu) held the preponderance of military and economic power. The bakufu directly controlled one-fifth of Japan's agricultural land, making it the largest land holder by far. Taxes from this land provided most of the bakufu's income. The bakufu also controlled all major cities and ports, even if they would otherwise be part of another warlord's domain. It owned all the gold and silver mines throughout Japan. In theory at least, the warlords ruled at the pleasure of the shōgun, who formally reappointed the warlords from time to time and had the authority to confiscate or reduce any domain. The first three shōguns often did confiscate domains of warlords they suspected of disloyalty or other problems. As time when on and the domains became well established, confiscations by the bakufu took place only under highly unusual circumstances.

The bakufu imposed numerous restrictions on warlords, the most important of which are included in the excerpts from Laws for Warrior Households above. Warlords were limited to a single castle and had to obtain bakufu permission to make any repairs on it. Warlords were forbidden to act in concert with each other on any matters of policy. Their relationships, in other words, were to be with the shōgun and the people of their domains, not each other. Even marriages were subject to shōgunal approval, and in previous material we have seen the potential power of marriages in Japanese politics. Should a warlord appear to have accumulated a major surplus of wealth, the shōgun might require him to build a bridge or do some other sort of work for the "public good" outside his own domain--in part as a way of draining off some of that wealth. Therefore, warlords gradually learned to hide their excess wealth from the bakufu and its inspectors, who visited each domain from time to time. Alternate attendance was a major drain on warlord finances, and a major source of wealth for the city of Edo.

The bakufu clearly held more power than any single warlord, but the warlords nevertheless governed with a high degree of autonomy within their domains. Warlords, for example, paid no regular taxes to the bakufu. As long as they fulfilled their duties to the shōgun, abided by the restrictions mentioned above, and caused no major problems, warlords were free to govern as they saw fit. Some domains issued their own currency, good only within its borders, and laws sometimes varied from one domain to the next. In the early decades of the Tokugawa period, the warlords were a culturally diverse group. By the second and third generations, however, all warlords spent their formative years in Edo, which resulted in a high degree of cultural homogeneity among them.

As the years went by, both the bakufu and the various warlords domains encountered fiscal problems and accumulated ever larger debts to the leading business establishments in Ōsaka and Edo. Indeed, the samurai class as a whole--which depended on fixed incomes, the value of which steadily shrank owing to inflation--tended to sink into poverty over the course of the eighteenth century. In the long run, it was the merchants who prospered during the Tokugawa period. Mainly for this reason, Tokugawa-era culture tended to celebrate merchant values and material culture. We examine certain aspects of Tokugawa-period culture in the next two chapters. Here, we jump to the end of the Tokugawa period to see how it came to an end and to sketch the outlines of the modern state that replaced it.

Fall of the Bakufu

During the 1850s and 60s, Japanese officials and thinkers in the bakufu and the domains gradually came to the realization that major change was necessary if Japan was to escape the fate of China. By 1860, China was well on its way to becoming a colony of the major European powers. It had lost major wars with Britain and France and was under the yoke of unequal treaties that gave Europeans and Americans vast political and economic rights in Asia's largest empire. Japanese officials had been watching the events in China with unease. Eventually, a combination of external pressure, initially from the United States, and internal dissent led to the fall of the Tokugawa bakufu in 1867. In 1868, a new government began to establish itself. A decade later, a strong, centralized government ruled Japan: the Meiji state.

Many lengthy books have been written analyzing the fall of the Tokugawa bakufu. Our discussion of this complex matter, however, shall be extremely brief. Starting in the 1830s, natural disasters, famines, and epidemics swept through Japan with unusually high frequency and severity. Economic decline became pronounced in many regions, and inflation was a major problem in urban areas. The frequency of peasant uprisings increased dramatically, as did membership in unusual religious cults. Organized society did not collapse, but many Japanese became uneasy about the present and future. Spontaneous, mass religious pilgrimages to famous shrines and temples (okage-mairi おかげ参り) became a frequent occurrence, many of which involved tens of thousands of people. These pilgrimages were especially large during the "okage years" おかげ年 which occurred once every twelve years in the lunar calendar. These mass pilgrimages contributed to the unease of government officials officials in the areas where they took place. It is not that they were specific uprisings against any of Japan's governments, but they demonstrated the potential power of emotionally-charged masses of ordinary people. Furthermore, these mass pilgrimages often had vague political overtones of a deity setting a world-gone-awry back in order. Popular art and other media became increasingly obsessed with death, murder, disaster, and calamities of all kinds, and this tendency became quite pronounced by the 1850s. Urban riots (uchikowashi 打ちこわし), typically in protest of high prices, also broke out in the cities. The bottom line is that *large numbers of people were worse off* (PDF version) in the 1840s and 50s than they had been in previous generations, the Tokugawa system was old and inflexible, and there was a general anxiety and sense that the world would soon change in a big way.

In the previous chapter, we examined a specific natural disaster of great importance: the Ansei Edo Earthquake of 1855. It functioned to weaken the bakufu in several ways, and thus indirectly contribute to the its collapse twelve years later. Be sure to study this event (by reading Chapter 2) if you have not done so already.

Intellectually, nativism (kokugaku 国学) had become firmly entrenched as a legitimate branch of scholarship. While it did not become more popular than Confucianism or Dutch studies, Confucian scholars and others began to accept certain of the core concepts nativism. In particular, the prestige of the emperor—long-forgotten and obscure until the middle of the Tokugawa period—began to rise as scholars explored, and in substantial part created, Japan's "ancient" past. By the 1840s, the theory that the emperor delegated his authority to the shōgun, who ruled on the emperor's behalf, had become widely accepted. Recall that no such thing had actually happened back in Tokugawa Ieyasu's time. Ieyasu and the early shōguns ruled because of raw power, of which they possessed the preponderance. By the 1840s, however, bakufu power had faded, as had that of most domains. The new perception of shōgun as emperor's delegate was a significant development. Why?  Because, if the shōgun ruled as the emperor's appointee, it would then be conceivable that the emperor could fire the shōgun and his government if the bakufu was to prove incompetent. What is important about this theory for our purposes is not that it was historically inaccurate. Instead, the key point is that from the 1840s onward, increasing numbers of Japanese elites began to believe that the emperor delegated his authority to the shōgun. As dissatisfaction with the bakufu grew, calls for the emperor to chastise the shōgun began to be heard.

For reasons that need not concern us here, the patterns of foreign relations established by the early shōguns gradually became rigid bakufu traditions. Throughout the 1800s, ever larger numbers of American whaling and trading vessels, and sometimes shipwrecked sailors, began to appear in Japanese waters. Ships in distress sometimes made their way into Japanese ports. The Japanese response was typically to provide such vessels with a bare minimum assistance and send them on their way with a warning not to come back. Shipwrecked sailors were usually repatriated via Chinese or Dutch ships sailing out of Nagasaki, which took them to Guangzhou. As U.S. whaling and trade with China increased, the desire grew to establish formal diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan. When it became known in the U.S. that Japan possessed coal in significant quantities, congress authorized #Commodore Matthew Perry# to sail to Edo with a large naval fleet to establish formal relations.

Perry arrived in 1853, landed, stated his intentions, and then told bakufu officials that he would return the next year. After several months in China, Perry returned to Edo with an even larger fleet, the purpose of which was to intimidate the bakufu with a show of potential force. Perry's strategy worked, and the bakufu, with some reluctance, signed a diplomatic treaty with the United States. Later, commercial treaties in 1858 opened several major ports in Japan to European and American residence and commerce. While some Japanese welcomed this expansion of foreign relations, others interpreted it as a sign of bakufu weakness and incompetence. Diverse groups began to unite in their dislike of the bakufu, adopting the slogan "sonnō-jōi" 尊皇[王]攘夷 ("Revere the sovereign; expel the barbarians!") The "sovereign" in this case meant the emperor, and the "barbarians" were the American and European foreigners. Those who disliked the bakufu for whatever reason began to rally around this slogan, and dissident samurai began a campaign of terror by assassination. Bear in mind that "sonnō-jōi" was an emotive slogan. It did not refer to any sort of systematic vision or program for political change.

By the early 1860s, a rough consensus had developed, shared even by many bakufu officials and allies, that major changes would be necessary were Japan to avoid China's fate at the hands of foreign imperialists. The shōgun sought to preserve a major role for the Tokugawa family in the new order, but bakufu opponents would settle for nothing less than his complete retirement from official life. Warfare on a significant but relatively small scale broke out over this issue during the last months of 1867 and the first months of 1868. When the shōgun realized that he lacked sufficient support to prevail, he surrendered peacefully to prevent large-scale loss of life. He received a generous financial settlement from the new government and *went into retirement.* The Tokugawa family still maintains a #cultural foundation# to preserve important historical documents and artifacts and to promote research.

The events that toppled the bakufu are known collectively as the Meiji Restoration (Meiji-ishin 明治維新) because, in theory at least, the emperor had been "restored" to his rightful place as Japan's actual head of state. The name that the emperor's handlers selected for his reign was "Meiji," which means something like "enlightened rule." As time when on, the emperor became a tremendously potent symbol of Japan as a nation. So awesome and lofty had he grown by the late 1930s, for example, that it became illegal for ordinary people even to look at him directly. Precisely because of their lofty statuses, however, Japan's modern emperors did not administer the country directly. Had they done so, they would have appeared too human and too fallible. When things went poorly, prime ministers and cabinet members could resign, but the emperor remained above the level of overt political struggle. When things went well, the emperor could and did share in the glory.

For the most part, Japan's modern emperors have been relatively passive sovereigns, content to follow the lead of their advisors. There have been a few key points, however, in which they intervened in serious issues. The Shōwa Emperor 昭和天皇 (Hirohito), for example, intervened decisively to put down a military uprising in 1936, and he made the decision to surrender to the allied forces in 1945. Ordinarily, however, he was more occupied with marine biology (author of four books on corals) than with day-to-day politics.

Establishing the Meiji State

Pause now to listen to a folk song (with English translation) about the imperial army that brought down the bakufu: click here

Consider the situation in early 1868. A relatively small number of medium to low ranking samurai, the leaders coming from only four different domains in the southern part of Japan, had deposed the bakufu and established a new government in the name of the *Emperor Meiji.* In the paragraphs that follow, I typically call this government the "Meiji state." The act of establishing this new imperial government is usually called the *"Meiji Restoration"* for reasons described in a previous paragraph.

This new government had many potential disadvantages. First, its leaders were young and lacking in prestige. Second, it had no money. Third, it had no army, the soldiers who had participated in the overthrow of the bakufu having been members of domain armies. On the other hand, however, there was a general consensus in Japan that change in the direction of a strong, centralized government was necessary to strengthen the country against imperialist aggression. Furthermore, the prestige of the emperor was high at this time, and the young leaders of the restoration could use this prestige to their advantage, at least for a short while.

The first thing they did was to move the emperor from Kyōto to the shōgun's former capital, which they renamed Tōkyō 東京 (literally: "Eastern Capital"). This action served to signify the location of the new government's power (Tōkyō) and its basis, the emperor's authority. Next, the restoration leaders issued a proclamation in the emperor's name. Called the Charter Oath (Gokajō no seimon 五ヵ条の誓文), it was apparently intended to reassure the domain leaders and other potential rivals of the new government that all was in good hands. Its five articles read as follows:

This short document is a good example of Meiji-period political rhetoric. It is vague enough to allow most readers to see in it whatever they would like. It starts by reassuring everyone that government will be conducted reasonably, taking a wide variety of views into account (in fact, the Meiji state quickly moved to narrow the range of those who had a voice in policy making). It then urges everyone to pitch in and support the new government. The fourth item suggests that major changes might take place, but only by way of eliminating "evil" customs, and who could argue with that—or with the "just laws of Nature?" But what exactly do these things mean? Finally, there is a recognition of the need to learn from the rest of the world, but with the proviso that such knowledge should ultimately serve to strengthen "imperial rule," that is, the power of the Meiji state.

Even with the benefit of imperial prestige, the new government was in a precarious position. It moved quickly to consolidate its power. To do so successfully, it needed three things: *money, power, and (metapahorical) sex appeal.* Let us start with money. Between 1868 and 1871, the new government inherited many of the bakufu's assets and obligations. The bakufu, however, was essentially broke at the time of the restoration, so the Meiji government urgently needed additional revenue. The single largest financial burden was the payment of samurai stipends throughout all of Japan, for which the Meiji government became responsible in 1871. Therefore, the government moved to reduce or eliminate samurai stipends as soon as possible. Late in 1873, it began to tax stipends and allowed samurai the option of converting their stipends to a one-time, lump-sum payment. Few samurai selected this option. In the summer of 1876, the Meiji government commuted all samurai stipends to intermediate-term government bonds. It distributed ¥174 million in bonds to roughly 313,000 individuals, which reduced government expenditures by 30%. By commuting the stipends to bonds, the new government also hoped that the samurai would have a stake in its survival. This move, combined with a phase out of samurai privileges and obligations essentially put an end to the samurai class by 1876, although the end was in sight as early as 1873. Many samurai did not do well on their own. For example, some sold their bonds at a discount to brokers and then invested their cash unwisely. During the 1870s discontent among the samurai or former samurai was a major source of civil discontent, which sometimes erupted in local rebellions against the Meiji government.

Power, in the case of the newly-created Meiji government, meant coercive police and military power. Indeed, coercive force is the very basis of any state or government (think about this matter for a moment--two essays: #moderately left-leaning# & #moderately right-leaning#), although the vast majority of governments go to great lengths to clothe such power in pleasant-looking attire. First, to buy time and forestall opposition, the new government appointed a wide variety of people to committees and advisory bodies that had impressive sounding names but little or no real power. Issuing the Charter Oath was part of this process.

In terms of more substantive change, the government sought to eliminate the domains and build up its military power. Although these two moves were really two sides of the same coin, we examine them separately here. Eliminating the domains was a tricky process. Typically, each warlords was willing to "give his domain back" to the emperor if that warlords were well compensated and if the other major warlords agreed to do the same. Securing such agreement required busy shuttle diplomacy. In the early spring of 1869, the four domains that led the Meiji Restoration—Satsuma 薩摩, Chōshū 長州 (the two most powerful), Tosa 土佐, and Hizen 肥前—issued a joint memorial "returning" their domains to the emperor and urging the other warlords to do the same. Some did and were immediately re-appointed as governors of the same territory over which they had been warlords. In substance, therefore, little had changed. In July of 1869, the new government ordered all warlords who had not already done so to "return" their lands to the emperor. They, too, were appointed governors. The next year, the central government began to issue orders to these warlords-turned-governors. Late in 1871, with the domains now theoretically at the emperor's disposal, the Meiji government formally abolished them. In their stead it created prefectures (ken 県). Then, in 1872, it reduced the number of prefectures to 72, with later reductions bringing the number down to 43. By this time, most of the former warlords no longer served as governors, although all of them were well compensated financially. The Meiji state was generous with the former warlords because it did not want any of them to become rallying points for opposition.

To make these major changes, of course, the new state required coercive power in the form of police and soldiers, at least as a background presence. In 1869 and into 1870, the new government relied on soldiers on "loan" from the domain of Satsuma. During these years, debate took place within the government about how best to build an effective army. Some saw the samurai class (hereditary warriors; about 7% of the population) as an ideal pool of soldiers, but most Meiji leaders argued that the samurai had long ago lost any special military skill they might have once had, and that samurai of different domains would be unlikely to get along with each other. The majority of Meiji officials favored a conscript army both in the interests of creating the most effective army possible and in the interests of promoting national unity. In 1872, the new government announced a plan for military conscription, and it went into effect the next year. Awkwardly called a #"blood tax,"# there was significant initial resistance to conscription among the common people. Nevertheless, the system worked, and by the late 1870s, the Meiji state had an effective army unconnected with the old domains or samurai class. Conscription continued until 1945, and it became an important means by which the state fostered a sense of "we Japanese" among ordinary people (more on this point later).

The third item, sex appeal, is a metaphor for the state's need for appealing, even seductive, symbols of authority and the nation. Ideal for this role was the *Meiji emperor* (PDF version). His youth, good looks, and vigor (he had a vast appetite for food, drink, horseback riding, and sex) made him the perfect symbol of a new Japan, a nation both ancient yet modern. And if the phrase "both ancient and modern" caught your attention here, very good. As we shall see in parts of other sections and chapters, the Meiji state portrayed itself to the rest of Japan and to the world as being rooted in ancient Japanese cultural traditions, while at the same time leading Japan into the modern world. Many contemporary observers outside of Japan are still obsessed with this formula, as we have seen in the Introduction. There was nothing terribly strange about this concern with ancient tradition in the Meiji state. Indeed, we shall see that one of the hallmarks of modern nations is laying claim to (and typically creating) ancient roots. Whenever you read criticism of Japan's imperial institution as being somehow "outdated" or "feudal," take such rants with a grain of salt. Though it may indeed be worthy of criticism, the imperial throne became a modern institution par excellence. There was nothing outdated about it. For the details see Takashi Fujitani's excellent book, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan.

Although the Meiji emperor was not a puppet, he had little interest in the tedious details of statecraft and government administration and was content that others attend to such matters. He trusted the leaders of the Meiji Restoration and typically went along with whatever policies they worked out. For their part, the Meiji leaders positioned themselves to speak in the emperor's name. They repeatedly portrayed the emperor as personifying and standing for "Japan" as a nation—still a rather abstract entity, at a time (1870s & 80s) when relatively few "Japanese" were accustomed to thinking of themselves as Japanese. Leading government officials, therefore, when representing the emperor's views (accurately or otherwise), positioned themselves on the side of the nation itself. This rhetorical and symbolic use of the emperor as a political weapon was often effective. It was relatively easy for the state to cast anyone who fundamentally opposed the new government, or subsequent Japanese governments, in the role of an enemy of the emperor and nation.

There was opposition. The 1870s were a time of numerous protests and uprisings of various sizes and scales. Ordinary people suffered under heavy tax burdens, conscription, and various intrusions of the state into realms of personal life such as dress and bathing customs (#for more details#). Many of the former samurai felt betrayed by the new order, and some were willing to rebel.

The greatest threat to the new government took place in 1877, when *Saigō Takamori*, hero of the Meiji Restoration and former high government official (resigned 1873), led a revolt against the Meiji state. *Saigō* had become disgusted with the direction of the new state, especially with what he considered its disregard for moral principles. Although he did not initiate the revolt, Saigō agreed to lead it once it began in his home province of Satsuma. Saigō set out with an army of some 15,000 former samurai, and news of the revolt energized the countryside. Inadequate preparation, however, and a terrible strategic blunder allowed the government to assemble sufficient forces to defeat Saigō's army after seven months of hard fighting. Saigō died during the final battle, and the precise details of his death are unclear. Later generations have idealized Saigō death, imagining it to have conformed to the idealized and romanticized samurai tradition. The 1877 rebellion was the greatest threat to the new government but it also marked then end of large-scale, internal, military opposition. It was the last gasp of the old order, led, ironically, by someone who had sacrificed greatly to destroy that old order. By 1878, a decade after it had started, the new Meiji state had become firmly established.

(For a vivid, readable, academically rigorous biography of Saigō Takamori, see Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigō Takamori. The film The Last Samurai is truly awful as history, though it is well made by the standards of cinematography and is excellent propaganda. It has had a major impact in Japan in the worst possible way. Many Japanese now think of the samurai "tradition" in terms of the film's portrayal.)

Making Japanese

Creating the Meiji state, though difficult, was one thing. Creating Japanese to go with it was as more difficult and time-consuming task. Italy became a state with a central government about about the same time as Japan. Commenting on Italy's unification in 1860, Massimo d'Azeglio made his famous remark that "We have made Italy, we now have to make Italians." What exactly did he mean by this statement? Precisely the same thing could have been said in Japan seven or eight years later: "We have made Japan, we now have to make Japanese." And this making of Japanese was no luxury to be accomplished at leisure. It was an urgent priority of the new Meiji state.

Nations and states (or countries) are not the same thing, even though this point is often confused (especially in the United States). If we allow some wiggle room, states are fairly easy to define. They are the institutions of formal government and the boundaries that these governments effectively control. The primary purpose of states is to enforce social order. States have multiple secondary purposes, and they vary from one state to the next, but order enforcement is what they all have in common.

Nations are more abstract. They are the products of people imagining that they belong to ethnic communicates. The existence of states is largely a matter of their power. States that lack the power to enforce order fairly effectively usually cease to exist. Nations, on the other hand, rely on the power of human imagination. What are the main elements in these imagined communities we call nations? One is a belief that "we ____" (French, Japanese, Kikuyu. . . --fill in the blank) share a common ancestry. Along with this belief is usually some kind of belief in a shared culture, even if that culture cannot be easily defined. Note that these beliefs need not be true (in fact, they often are not). As long as a significant number of people believe them, the nation exists.

So, for example, the Kurds (who live mainly in Turkey, Iraq and Iran) are a nation? Yes--because of their self-conscious identity as Kurds. Note that in the case of the Kurds, there is no official Kurdish state (as of early 2007, there is a de facto but unofficial Kurdish state in part of Iraq). So they are a nation without a state, and this situation is quite common around the world. Indeed, it is the cause of much bloodshed as nations seek to create states for themselves. Moreover, most states contain within their boundaries two or more nations---consider the well-known examples of Belgium and Canada. This matter can become quite complex, but we will set it aside for now and take up the question of nations and states again in Chapter 6.

The main point here is that the combination of a nation and a state, each occupying the same territory (i.e., all or nearly all of the residents of a state regard themselves as members of the same nation) is a formula for military and economic power. The congruency of nation and state is called, logically enough, a nation-state. There are few nation states in the world, but Japan's new leaders set out to make one. The made the state first, and by the end of 1878 it was secure. The next step was to inculcate a self-conscious awareness of Japanese identity among Japan's population. This task was relatively easy in Tokyo. The reason, as we have seen in Chapter 2, was that the popular media there had already gone far in promoting a Japanese identity. The same was true to varying degrees in other large cities. In the countryside, however, where the majority of the population still lived, creating national identity was not so easy. In 1870, for example, many rural Japanese did not use the term "Japan" (Nihon or Nippon 日本), did not know who the emperor was, and thought of their identity in terms of their village, or, at the widest, in terms of their domain. The common term for "domain" in ordinary speech was kuni 国, which today means country. In other words, a typical farmer in Satsuma would have regarded a similar farmer from northern Japan as a foreigner from another kuni (domain/country). Moreover, if they were to try to converse, they would not have understood each other's language. There was much work for the Meiji state to do in Making Japanese out of such people. Thanks mainly to a state-run education system (with help from other institutions), this task was largely complete by the 1890s. In China, as we will see, the process of making Chinese took much longer.